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Abstract : 
State building and state competition during the 16th century triggered a creative moment in the 
history of public finance. Recent scholarship has clearly identified the Papal States and their 
communities as active participants both in the state building process and the reorganization of 
public finance. Banking on a wealth of fiscal records, it is argued that Papal authority succeeded in 
forging a new fiscal pact – which lasted over two centuries - between central and local authorities. 
Blending conservatism and innovation the papacy promoted a contractual approach: local powers 
were granted a large degree of autonomy in selecting fiscal instruments, the types of wealth to be 
taxed and the means of collecting resources, while the Apostolic Chamber secured both the control 
of a growing portion of the provinces’ fiscal  income as well as access to a pool of financial 
resources at a rapidly declining cost. 
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1. Recent scholarship has clearly identified the Papal States and its larger 
communities as active and creative participants both in the European state building 
process and in the financial revolution of the early modern period. In establishing 
firmer control over territories in Central Italy the Papacy was able to bank on Italian 
city republics tradition, which Popes managed to update and recast in the context of a 
territorial state. The impersonal character attributed to the state by republican regimes 
was well  suited to the Papacy, as an electoral monarchy.  
                                                 
1 Paper presented at international Colloque « Ressources publiques et construction étatique en Europe. Fiscalité et dette 
publique, XIIIe-XVIIIe siècle », held at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Ministères èconomique et 
financier, 2-3 July 2012. 
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 This paper will argue that the 16th century Papacy succeeded in forging a new 
fiscal pact between central and local authorities. Blending conservatism and 
innovation the papacy promoted a contractual approach: central authority established 
its exclusive right to impose tributes while local powers were granted a large degree 
of autonomy in selecting fiscal instruments, the types of wealth to be taxed and the 
means of collecting resources.  
From the mid-15th century the Papacy was engaged in two difficult intertwined 
struggles: to consolidate its Italian domains - threatened by external aggression as 
well as internal anarchy - and to shore up its finances sapped by involvement in 
costly wars and the drying up of the flow of “spiritual” revenues from all over 
Catholic Europe. The Protestant storm added dramatic urgency to an already critical 
situation. Papal finances emerged from this crisis largely transformed: although 
“spiritual” revenues continued to provide a contribution to the treasury, it was 
temporal revenues that took the lead. Fiscal income from Papal territories increased 
over three times during the 16th century, surging from about 330,000 silver scudi in 
1526 to 1,045,000 scudi in 1599. Fiscal receipts more than doubled again in the first 
half of the 17th century, reaching about 2.2 million silver scudi in 1657, to stabilize 
afterwards around that figure. Compared to overall Papal income, the contribution 
brought in by fiscal receipts increased markedly from little more than half (55% in 
1526) to nearly nine tenths by the early 1670s (Tab. 1).  
  
 Tab. 1 – Fiscal income and public debt in the Papal States (1526-1672) 
 
Year 
Temporal 
revenues 
% of total 
income  Total revenues Overall public debt 
 scudi  scudi Scudi 
1526 329,986 55.4 594,986 2,796,210 
1576 706,426 74.7 945,315 7,040,650 
1592 1,181,131 73.8 1,601,195 10,520,678 
1619 1,374,520 76.8 1,790,520 15,975,623 
1657 2,222,003 82.8 2,684,515 30,723,339 
1672 2,243,441 88.3 2,541,039 37,784,307 
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 The domains in Central Italy shouldered the largest share of the growing tax 
burden. For instance, between 1576 and 1678 the three northern provinces of Umbria, 
Marca and Romagna provided roughly two fifths of papal temporal revenues, but 
while their share remained fairly stable - actually dropping a little from 39.6% to 
38.1% - yet the actual sums raised from their communities expanded in a spectacular 
fashion, posting a threefold leap: from 295,000 scudi to 969,000 scudi (Tab. 2).  
 
 
 Tab. 2 – State revenues raised by the northern provinces of the Papal States 
 
Year Umbria 
(scudi) 
% of state 
revenues 
Marca 
(scudi) 
% of state 
Revenues 
Romagna 
(scudi) 
% of state 
Revenues 
1576 68,144 9.6 137,609 19.4 89,436 12.6 
1589 107,361 9.3 162,239 14.1 139,436 12.1 
1619 133,879 9.6 237,819 17.2 150,832 10.9 
1657 240,766 10.8 405,397 18.2 220,369 9.9 
1678 251,645 9.9 394,170 15.5 323,501 12.7 
 
 
 2. As Popes succeeded to establish stricter control over their territories in 
Central Italy, the system of taxation was subject to considerable revision, designed to 
extract more resources, to establish centrally controlled bureaucratic procedures and 
to introduce a degree of equality and uniformity. However, efforts did not meet with 
equal success in the three areas.  
From the early decades of the 16th century it was apparent a concerted effort at 
establishing administrative rights, at asserting fiscal sovereignty and at casting a more 
effective fiscal net across Papal lands. Since nearly all taxation was administered and 
exacted at the municipal level, existing fiscal rights and procedures had to be 
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documented and, possibly, revised. Roughly between the 1530s and the 1550s local 
authorities across the land produced and submitted a tremendous wealth of 
descriptions of existing municipal rights and practices. For instance on 10 March 
1555 the Senate of Bologna submitted to the approval of Pope Julius III a thorough 
documentation of all tributes levied in the city and the territory subject to it. Origins 
and destination of each tribute were spelled out as well as how it was assessed and 
collected.   
Existing systems of municipal taxation were largely left in place to cover for 
the costs of local administrations. But the introduction of new taxation as well as 
additions to existing dues became the exclusive preserve of the sovereign. In practice 
local boards were subordinated, without exception, to state authority on fiscal 
matters.  
Most new taxation took the form of centrally controlled state-wide tributes.  
Quite frequently new taxes started as extraordinary levies, but once introduced most 
new tributes tended to become permanent. The model was the so called Sussidio 
Triennale, issued by Pope Paul III as a temporary – three year - tribute in 1543, then 
twice reiterated and finally made permanent in 1552, to become popularly known as 
eternale. Between 1529 and 1600 no less than nineteen new state tributes were 
introduced. Most of these were lesser taxes, such as danni dati (proceeds of justice), 
archivio (public records), legna (wood), carte da gioco (cards), pesi e misure 
(weights and measures), pelli e cuoi (leatherworks) and so on. Only a handful - five – 
had in practice a major financial impact: Triennale (1543, real estate), quattrino 
(1555, meat), cavalli morti (1559, subsidy for the army), foglietta (1588, wine), 
galere (1588, subsidy for the upkeeping of the fleet). At the end of the 16th century 
the combined yield of these five tributes represented almost 50% of temporal 
revenues. 
Fiscal income posted remarkable increases across  Papal territories from the 
early decades of the 16th century to the second half of the 17th century, but this 
expansion conceals two very different trends: on the one hand the yield of local dues 
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stagnated or barely moved, on the other the yield of state tributes spiralled upward. 
Evidence from surviving balance sheets of the main communities of the Romagna 
confirms that in the central decades of the 16th century a remarkable shift took place: 
revenues raised in the towns of Imola, Ravenna, Forlì and Cesena expanded at a very 
fast pace. (Fig. 1). The lion’s share of this increase however went to benefit only state 
coffers, in fact on average the share of state revenues jumped from less than half to 
about four fifths (Fig. 2).  
More favorable to local authorities was the situation in Bologna, which was 
able to retain greater autonomy, yet the long-term trend was hardly different. 
Between the 1540s and the 1590s the share of fiscal receipts claimed by state climbed 
from less than 30% to 50%.   
 
 
Fig. 1- Total revenues collected in Imola, Forlì, Ravenna and Cesena, 
1520-1660 
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Fig. 2 – Share of state revenues in Imola, Forlì, Ravenna, Cesena and 
Bologna, 1520-1660 
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The issuance of the De bono regimine bull and the establishment of the 
Congregazione del Buon Governo in 1592 completed the process of subordination of 
local to state government. Communities - with very few exceptions - had to submit 
every year the tavola (a provisional budget of income and expenditures) and were 
subject to authorization on part of the Congregazione. In this way the central 
government was able to monitor the actual flow of fiscal resources, to control 
municipal indebtdness and, possibly, to discourage financial malpractices at the local 
level. 
To handle fiscal resources the Apostolic Chamber relied on a network of 
provincial treasuries, who were farmed out to merchant bankers. Treasurers 
guaranteed both a steady flow of resources and payments in advance. In the main 
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local treasurers did not collect taxes but relied on an indirect system: subjects paid 
dues to local authorities who in turn paid taxes to provincial treasurers, who were 
responsible for handling money on behalf of the Apostolic Chamber. 
 
3. Popes recognized the composite nature of the realm they presided and the 
limits of coercive options. In the main they preferred to advance their sovereignty by 
consent and cooperation through the signing of pacts and agreements rather than by 
the exercise of dictatorial power. Acceptance of Papal sovereignty did not translate in 
the dismantling of local governing practices but rather in their updating. In practice 
Papal absolutism was “limited” and required the active cooperation of local élites.    
New state taxation aimed, at least in theory, at introducing relevant 
innovations, the most important of which was universal application to territories as 
well as individuals, regardless of status and privileges. In practice application fell 
considerably short of that end: a universal system of taxation upon territories as well 
as an equal division of the tax burden between economic activities and social groups 
failed to emerge. Instead growth of fiscal pressure went hand in hand with Papal 
ability to forge alliances with local elites and the mosaic pattern of immunities and 
privileges was not rolled back. The well known sussidio triennale (1543), commonly 
heralded by historians of Papal finance as the most significant attempt to introduce a 
new and uniform tribute across the land, provides an exemplary tale. Although 
conceived as a model state tax, affecting all communities without exceptions and 
exemptions, its application was subject to negotiations with local authorities, which 
managed to reduce its weight and, more important, won the right to assess and levy 
the tribute as they saw fit. Each community had to pay a precise share of the burden 
but could choose how to apply the new tax. For examples most communities in 
Romagna placed the burden on real estate, while Bolognese authorities opted to 
shield landowners and to collect it by way of various duties instead (such as grain, 
gates and silk).   
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In its relentless quest to extract ever more resources from its domains the 
Papacy accepted the mediation of local authorities, leaving actual implementation to 
local boards. The contractual nature of the relations between Popes and the various 
components of the state is evident from the ability of communities on assuming 
responsibilities for the assessment and collection of taxes by means they thought fit. 
Nowhere this pattern is more obvious than in Bologna, the second largest city of the 
Papal States. Annexed in 1506, Bologna was able to secure terms, which granted 
civic authorities considerable latitude for independent action and guaranteed that 
Papal will would be mediated through city offices. Deference and loyalty to the 
Pope/king paid handsome dividends.  
Not surprisingly fiscal geography mirrored power relations within the state, 
among and within communities, rather than taxable wealth. The triennale was 
assessed for 62,000 scudi in the Marca but for 42,000 in Umbria, despite the fact that 
the latter had more inhabitants (300,000 against 280,000) and an overall more 
prosperous urban economy. Even more spectacular the advantage enjoyed by the 
Legazione of Bologna, which was charged just 12,000 scudi, despite a population in 
excess of 200,000. Within provinces differences could be equally disturbing: in 
Romagna Faenza, Forlì and Cesena paid 5,060, 4,370 and 6,095 respectively 
although both their economic conditions and overall population were roughly the 
same. Substantial differences in treatment characterized urban and rural areas, as well 
as different social groups within cities. In the main country folks and urban lower 
classes ended up shouldering most of the burden. 
 
4. As temporal revenues soared so did the ability of the Apostolic Chamber to 
mobilize additional financial resources through borrowing. From the mid-16th century 
onward the largest single charge on Papal income was the servicing of the debt, 
which at mid-17th century absorbed a about 60% of total income collected.  
The new system of Papal debt proved to be remarkably efficient. It generated 
an ever larger number of issues which were run separately. In little more than a 
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century and a half the Treasury had authorized 187 separate issues. The overall debt 
increased at a rapid pace throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. From 1526 to 1599 
Papal funded debt more than tripled jumping from 3.3 to 11.6 million scudi. It more 
than tripled again during the 17th century reaching 39.7 million scudi in 1678. 
 
 
Tab. 3 – Papal States overall debt and servicing costs, 1526-1678. 
  Debt service 
 Total Debt  debt/income 
 scudi scudi % 
1526 2,796,210 211,207 35.5 
1576 7,040,650 404,227 42.8 
1599 11,665,223 762,095 52.9 
1619 15,975,623 826,801 46.2 
1657 30,723,339 1,313,062 48.9 
1678 39,675,197 1,643,573 64.7 
 
 
Establishing credibility meant winning and mantaining the trust of lenders. 
And the emission of Papal funded debt (mont)i was tailored to that end. As debtors 
Popes were readier than other monarchs to adopt policies conducive to trust: 
providing binding sets of guarantees, limiting discretion and accepting responsibility 
for financial obligations incurred by their predecessors. The contractual limits to 
Papal power were reassuring to perspective creditors and enhanced rather than hinder 
Popes’ ability to borrow. Investors’ trust in Papal debt is illustrated by the Apostolic 
Chamber’s ability to borrow very large sums of money at sharply declining interest 
rates. Between mid-16th century and mid-17th century nominal interest paid on 
redeemable bonds halved from 8% to 4%. Returns were further cut to just 3% with 
the large concentration of a jumble of different issues into the St. Peter bonds 
between 1684 and 1686. Considering that bonds traded regularly above par on the 
secondary market, the rate of returns investors were willing to accept was even lower, 
a clear indication that Papal government had fully succeeded in asserting itself as one 
of the most reliable borrower in Europe. Indeed in the second half of the 17th century 
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the Papacy was able to raise money at less than half the cost shouldered by 
contemporary French and English monarchs.   
This said it has to be noticed that Papal financial needs rose faster than fiscal 
income and despite the declining cost of borrowing the weight of debt servicing rose 
dangerously, absorbing two thirds of revenues by the 1670s. 
 
5. Success in expanding and modernizing state finance in the 16th century came 
at a price. It underscored the contractual nature of relations. Papal predicament was 
that the cornerstone of the new system – close cooperation with local élite – stood in 
the way of further advances. Municipal as well as class privilege persisted. Papal 
attempts to widen the state fiscal base and to introduce more equitable forms of 
taxation made little headway, precisely because they required the coopeartion of the 
very groups that had most to lose from fiscal reforms. By the mid-17th century, as the 
system approached its upper limits the contractual character of Papal power ceased to 
be an asset to become an insuperable barrier to both greater financial integration and 
economic development. 
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